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Staying off the Bottom of the Melting Pot: 
Somali Refugees Respond to a 
Changing U.S. Immigration Climate
Ihotu Ali
As a nation of immigrants, the United States has also been a 
nation of nativists…We have welcomed immigrants in periods 
of expansion and optimism, reviled them in periods of stagna-
tion and cynicism…In short, American nativism has had less to 
do with ‘them’ than us…Fear and loathing of foreigners reach 
such levels when the nation’s problems become so intractable 
that some people seek scapegoats. Typically, these periods fea-
ture a political or economic crisis, combined with a loss of faith 
in American institutions and a sense that the national community 
is gravely fractured. Nativists’ targets have reflected America’s 
basic divisions: class, race, religion, and, to a lesser extent, lan-
guage and culture.
“Cycles of Nativism in U.S. History,” 
The National Immigration Forum
Immigrants thrive best in socially and politically supportive envi-
ronments that allow them to change most of their social and 
cultural practices at their own pace…Doing so, in turn, allows 
immigrants to build up their confidence and sense of belonging 
gradually but deeply…A model grounded on equity and mutu-
ality, and a more organic rather than forced pace of adaptation, 
holds the most promise.
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 
Co-Director of the Migration Policy Institute
I. Globalized Neighborhoods: Theories on Migration
A. The Phenomenon
In October 2002, a once-thriving economy and Franco-American town 
was in decline. Lewiston, Maine was already hurting after its textile 
mills closed and thousands of residents lost their jobs; however, a sud-
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den influx of Somali refugees arguably had an even greater impact. 
Somali refugees had come to Lewiston, either directly from refugee 
camps or from “war zones” in inner-city Atlanta, to escape violence 
and settle in a town where housing was affordable and it “seemed like 
a good place to bring up kids.”1 Their children attracted federal dol-
lars into Lewiston schools and, with local university degrees, many 
Somalis worked in Lewiston hospitals and opened small businesses 
to employ one another. However, when crime and welfare caseloads 
began to rise, the Lewiston Mayor wrote a public letter urging Soma-
lis not to invite any more relatives to Lewiston. He claimed the city 
needed “breathing room” and was “maxed out, financially, physically, 
and emotionally.”2 Hollywood’s release of Black Hawk Down incited the 
issue, intensifying the memory of soldiers killed in Somalia, and native 
Lewistonians angrily protested in the streets.3 City officials were able 
to avert a major conflict, however many other cities across the United 
States have felt similar tensions when newcomers suddenly enter a 
community.
In Lewiston and beyond, resettled Somalis face accusations of hav-
ing terrorist connections, unfairly receiving public assistance, or not 
deserving the full rights accorded to other Americans. It was not always 
this way. Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly 
restricted the social and civil rights of non-citizens by limiting their 
access to public assistance, cutting funding for social services, ques-
tioning their loyalty to the nation, and deporting them. In this coun-
try of immigrants, where immigration is perpetually controversial, it 
seems the pendulum of public approval has swung away from today’s 
newcomers. Perhaps Somali refugees entered the U.S. at an inoppor-
tune moment. Since the 1990s they have arrived in the thousands, 
many as penniless refugees in the midst of an anti-welfare movement, 
as xijaab-wearing4 Muslims in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and 
as taxi drivers and hotel staff in a period of competition over low-wage 
and “illegal” labor. Somalis defy America’s social categories as black, 
Muslim, and Arab-African immigrants. Many of their ways of cooking, 
family structures, religious duties, and communication styles challenge 
U.S. cultural norms, workweek schedules, and apartment occupancy 
rules. This academic project will analyze the cyclical changes in U.S. 
support for immigrants and refugees. It will focus on Somalis in Min-
nesota as a case through which to view the health of the nation: Have 
we maintained our values of tolerance and respect for diversity? Are 
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we still willing and able to integrate newcomers into a multicultural 
United States?
B. The Concept of Migration
Flows of immigration due to economic disparities and civil conflict 
now land many of the world’s people and their unique cultures, reli-
gions, and languages, on the same neighborhood block. Such heteroge-
neity, however, is difficult to maintain and may escalate into conflict if 
not carefully managed. The “internationalization” of Minnesota neigh-
borhoods, such as the West Bank or Lake Street, brings issues of for-
eign policy and stereotypes of faraway nations into a local context of 
urban struggle over jobs, housing, transportation, schools, and health 
care. Increasingly polarized governmental units parallel an increas-
ingly polarized American constituency. As external foreign affairs and 
internal immigration politics both grow tenuous, voices from the local 
to the national levels call out for a view of immigration in a new light.
Stripped of politics and debate, the essence of migration is change. 
It reorganizes social demography, capital flows, and value systems. 
Migration creates a sense of upheaval for individual migrants as well 
as their sending and receiving countries, and communities are trans-
planted and transformed in the process, for better or worse. Immigra-
tion historically generates controversy for the state because it defies 
borders and incites social tensions, yet it also provides a labor boost for 
slow economies. Efforts are constantly made to harness migrant flows 
for the best interests of the state, yet it is an unpredictable force.5 Stud-
ies on migration are increasingly interdisciplinary, incorporating anal-
ysis from economic, sociological, historical, and most recently, political 
and legal perspectives.6 Scholars today differ from earlier theorists by 
acknowledging that migration is not uniformly “positive” or “nega-
tive,” but has varied consequences on society and impacts individuals 
in different ways. One emerging and popular view, international politi-
cal economy theory, analyzes migration with a broad brush and consid-
ers its effect upon (and the influences of) all sub-national, national, and 
transnational interest groups. This postmodern view sees migration as 
the result of multi-level actors: transnational institutions, such as the 
United Nations or International Organization on Migration; national 
policies; globalizing economies and ideas; pro- or anti-immigrant 
political coalitions; geographical boundaries between nations; and the 
will of the migrants and their host communities.7 Thus, we can under-
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stand that Somalis entered the United States as the result of many dif-
ferent factors—primarily pushed away from war and pulled toward 
economic opportunity—and that their arrival, in turn, will affect many 
different aspects of life in their new home.
C. Changes in Citizenship
Somalis will not enter their new country as if in a vacuum. They will 
become part of the fabric that defines the nation, and eventually may be 
considered formal “citizens,” although this concept has changed over 
time. In most Western industrialized nations, citizenship holds two 
functions: (1) to define and unify a civic community, and (2) to endow 
its members with certain rights and ensure a basic level of welfare. 
T.H. Marshall advocated for a liberal “welfare state” to uphold these 
citizenship rights, however, his principles have recently been chal-
lenged by neo-liberal theorists and Thatcher-Reaganesque social con-
servatives. Many American political conservatives now emphasize the 
necessity of “citizen duties” to complement Marshall’s citizen rights. 
This philosophy of rights earned by duties, suggestive of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s social contract, now outweighs Marshall’s social rights in 
contemporary policies, particularly with regard to non-citizens.8 Full 
and legal citizenship has become increasingly difficult for foreigners to 
acquire, as the concept has dissolved into a series of debates over the 
“integration” of immigrants and whether they need or deserve govern-
mental assistance to achieve this goal.
United States history books describe success and social mobility 
as “pulling yourself up by your bootstraps” or following the prin-
ciples of “rugged individualism” to achieve the “American Dream.” 
Some scholars argue that this was not always the case, that earlier 
immigrants actually received considerable government support. None-
theless, today’s national policies assume the self-sufficiency of most 
immigrants and their families. Prior to 1996, all legal permanent resi-
dents (including refugees) were eligible for the same welfare benefits 
as citizens. All U.S. residents received “social” rights including welfare 
eligibility, whereas citizenship was only required for voting. Now citi-
zenship is required in order to receive most forms of social assistance. 
Movements like California Proposition 187 attempted to restrict this 
line of rights even further, by withholding all public services and edu-
cation from non-citizens, particularly undocumented immigrants. The 
lines between citizenship and welfare and self-sufficiency are cloudy 
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at best, and Somali migrants, among others, are caught in the midst of 
debates that may seriously affect their ability to survive in their new 
country.
D. Integrating New Americans
Every generation finds a way to categorize new immigrants as “for-
eign;” the Irish were considered too brash, the Protestants too sacri-
legious, and the Italians too dark-skinned. Culture, religion, and race 
still represent the alien elements in today’s immigrants, many of whom 
come from undeveloped and/or conflict-ridden countries in the Global 
South. Past immigration debates promoted ethnic identity politics in 
the 1970s,9 or images of America as an assimilationist “melting pot” or 
multicultural “mixed salad” to its increasingly diverse population.10 
Today, contemporary views dominate, such as Alejandro Portes’ theory 
of “segmented” or “downward assimilation” of immigrants into a blue-
collar urban society11 or Alba and Nee’s “new assimilation” theory of a 
more culturally mixed America.12 However, many immigration experts 
now look beyond the images of pots and salads to refer to immigrant 
integration as a “two-way street.” This interdisciplinary adaptation to 
one’s environment follows the rights-and-duties or “social contract” 
model to ensure balance. By acknowledging the agency of immigrants, 
we can develop a mutual “give and take” relationship between immi-
grants and the host society. This “critical adaptation” results from each 
community’s impact on the others.13
The one certainty about integration is that it requires time. Immi-
grants first must “resettle” in the new country, and satisfy their imme-
diate needs, such as food, housing, and basic income. As they become 
familiar with their new environment, a process of “integration” fol-
lows as they psychologically adapt to a new “home” and integrate 
into social networks and economic, political, and cultural activities. 
Unlike resettlement, which happens over days or weeks, integration 
may take years or up to a lifetime.14 According to this model, newcom-
ers and U.S.-born individuals gradually move toward building a new 
synthesis of community that recognizes and respects both. This is a 
more holistic definition of resettlement because it considers the short-
term and long-term welfare of newcomers as well as the welfare of the 
entire community.
This article discusses the intersection of these three concepts: migra-
tion, citizenship in a welfare state and the idea of a “social contract,” 
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and the integration of new immigrants. Somali immigrants are enter-
ing the United States via proliferating routes and means of migration, 
as they escape civil war and seek opportunities for education and 
employment. As legal residents, they are entitled to rights and given 
responsibilities, yet are also caught up in policy debates over how 
much (if any) government assistance they should receive. The Ameri-
can public is also indecisive about how to receive the foreigners, as 
welcome members of society or as unwanted intruders. This essay will 
outline how Somalis fare and respond to such an immigration climate.
II. Give Me Your Tired and Poor: U.S. Refugee Policy and Process
A. Research Questions and Method
This study is guided by the following key question: What is the nature 
of today’s climate of immigration and integration? This is the overriding 
question guiding this project; however, several preliminary questions 
are addressed in the following Somali refugee case study:
1.  Why have so many Somali refugees come to Minneapolis–St. Paul, 
Minnesota?
2.  In what ways has the United States and Minnesota impacted 
Somali refugees’ resettlement and integration processes?
3.  In what ways have Somalis impacted Minneapolis–St. Paul since 
their arrival?
4.  How can an integrated and diverse “New Twin Cities” be re-envi-
sioned according to the needs of both Somalis and prior residents 
of the Twin Cities?
This research provides a snapshot into the ongoing resettlement 
and integration of Somalis in the Twin Cities. It features an analysis 
of major U.S. policy shifts between 1996 and 2006 by assessing the 
academic literature, national policy briefs, graduate dissertations, and 
U.S. census and immigration records. Field research on Somali refugee 
communities consisted of twelve interviews with administrators of six 
resettlement organizations, two focus groups (male and female), and 
review of community discussions, publications, and documentaries.15
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B. Entering the United States
New York City’s Statue of Liberty stands as a global symbol of free-
dom, safety, and refuge. It has welcomed newcomers “home” to Amer-
ican shores for more than 120 years. The Hart-Cellar Act lifted the 
quotas system in 1965 to allow increasing immigration from Africa and 
Asia, changing the formerly European character of prior immigration 
flows. Fifteen years later, the Refugee Act established a formal sys-
tem to accept refugees and asylees.16 Whereas refugees had previously 
been admitted in an ad hoc and politically biased process, the Refu-
gee Act modeled the United Nations’ admission guidelines from the 
1949 Geneva Convention. The Refugee Act was a monumental show of 
support for global refugees and resettlement programs in third-party 
countries; the United States alone has admitted over 2.6 million refu-
gees and asylees since 1975.17 Through the Hart-Cellar and Refugee 
Acts, the U.S. government institutionalized the values of ethnic diver-
sity and support for victims of persecution. This humanitarian view of 
accepting foreigners into the United States prevailed throughout the 
late 20th century. However, swift changes in U.S. political ideology 
and the social welfare state, beginning in the mid-1980s, soon eroded 
key elements of this immigration policy paradigm. This section out-
lines the basic process of refugee resettlement in the United States and 
Minnesota in particular, and the ways in which internal political and 
economic changes (specifically welfare reform and the reaction to the 
attacks of September 11) now threaten U.S. commitments to support-
ing refugee welfare and welcome.
The first steps of the resettlement process begin overseas, where the 
State Department evaluates refugees for their potential for “success-
ful resettlement” in the United States. “Voluntary resettlement agen-
cies” (VOLAGs) teach about American culture and government as well 
as practical skills, such as how to use foreign appliances.18 Once the 
refugees finally arrive, the broader social processes of “resettling” and 
“adapting” are decidedly more complicated. The U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services takes over from the State Department to 
coordinate hundreds of public and non-profit refugee service provid-
ers across the country. Ten national VOLAGs are contracted to case 
manage new refugees and, with $425 per capita over 90 days, provide 
each refugee with “core” resettlement services like access to housing 
and food, home visits, and referrals to employment and education 
programs. After this period, refugees are served by a network of public 
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services, non-profit organizations, and community and family mem-
bers.
In Minnesota, the Department of Human Services (DHS) oversees 
local networks, including partnerships between “mainstream”19 and 
ethnic community-based efforts to serve refugee needs. It works pri-
marily with high-capacity mainstream organizations, such as Lutheran 
Social Services of Minnesota and Catholic Charities. DHS also pro-
vides technical support and capacity building for smaller, community-
based organizations that often arise to serve specific (and often new) 
refugee and immigrant communities. Known as Mutual Assistance 
Associations (MAAs), these organizations are created and led by more 
established former refugee members of the ethnic community to aid 
newcomers.
An overall “resettlement infrastructure” is organically constructed, 
particularly in urban areas, to serve new refugees in a decentralized, 
public-nonprofit network of social services. This network of outside 
assistance, coupled with mutual efforts by prior and new arrivals, has 
supported refugees in cities across the United States for decades. How-
ever, this collaborative support network is among the first elements of 
U.S. refugee resettlement efforts to suffer from shifts in legislation and 
funding.
C. Minnesota’s Resettlement Climate: Contradictions
Although an unlikely destination for any traveler, something about 
wintry Minnesota has attracted a steady stream of immigrants and 
refugees from East Africa, Laos, and Thailand for over 20 years.20 
Aside from the inclement weather, most of these immigrants enjoy 
the state and cite similar reasons for their choice: plentiful (skilled and 
unskilled) jobs, good public schools, an existing community of their 
ethnic or national origin, and a warm social welcome. Minnesota has 
a long history of progressive politics and a dynamic business com-
munity. It is nationally recognized for its abundant educational oppor-
tunities, relatively low urban poverty and crime rates, commitment to 
public health and safety, and overall high standard of living.21 Despite 
some urban-rural differences, the Twin Cities are politically left-lean-
ing and have produced national figures, such as Vice President Hubert 
H. Humphrey and Senator Paul Wellstone, who both supported immi-
gration and safety-net programs for the poor. The state has long pro-
vided generous public assistance programs to all eligible individuals 
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and families, and its statewide public education system is considered a 
national model. Twenty-eight percent of state expenditures go to social 
welfare programs, and the Twin Cities offer a plethora of social ser-
vices, ranging from non-profit organizations and neighborhood asso-
ciations to homeless shelters and food shelters.22
The Economist published an article in 1999 titled, “Minnesota’s Job 
Market: Land of 10,000 Opportunities,” bringing national attention 
to the thriving economy and high citizen-participation rates common 
to Midwestern states.23 In addition to an active private sector, Min-
nesota has dynamic public and non-profit sectors and a social culture 
of “Minnesota nice,” built up from generations of civic engagement 
and volunteerism facilitated by faith communities and other organi-
zations. Minnesota is home to the nation’s first immigrant settlement 
houses and battered women’s shelters, and was among the first states 
to accept Holocaust survivors into the United States in 1948.24 If a large 
job market first enticed Somalis to Minnesota, it is likely that the gov-
ernment and community support they receive persuaded them to stay 
and invite their families to join them.
Yet Minnesota is not impervious to change. Despite a history of 
Democrats holding the majority in congressional politics, Republicans 
have grown in numbers and power in recent years. Soon after fiscal 
conservatism emerged on the national stage, it was felt in Minnesota 
as well, and budget cuts in historic social programs were rationalized 
by the “economic crisis” faced by state and local governments across 
the country. One Hennepin County employee admits that, “the tone 
of Minnesota has changed over the last few years,” particularly since 
Governor Tim Pawlenty came into office with an anti-illegal-immi-
gration campaign, which spawned negative media attention around 
undocumented immigrants. He also pushed (unsuccessfully) for driv-
er’s licenses to state one’s legal status.25 The employee continued, say-
ing, “given the political flavor in Minnesota right now, you’ve got 
still some remaining liberals who are fine with extending benefits, 
but they’re saying let’s pick our battles and maybe this is one we don’t 
really want to fight.” According to this county employee, the future 
of Minnesota’s traditionally warm welcome and social programs for 
immigrants and refugees, despite their history, is increasingly subject 
to fluctuations in the budget.
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D. Cracks in the Welfare State
After decades of liberal social programs throughout the Great Soci-
ety period and Civil Rights revolution, conservative Republicans, 
such as President Ronald Reagan, promoted a swift change in the 
role of government and assistance for society’s young, elderly, dis-
abled, and working classes. Between 1996 and 2006, unprecedented 
change occurred in American values and views, particularly regarding 
foreigners: Democrats who had historically supported welfare pro-
grams turned against them on the basis of “economic inefficiencies,” 
and laissez-faire economics was believed to lift all U.S. residents out of 
poverty, through employment. To relieve overburdened budgets, non-
citizens were removed from key assistance programs and immigrants 
who threatened to place too large a demand on the state were denied 
residency papers. Then, to add to the mix, a handful of Muslim men 
crashed planes into the World Trade Center in 2001, and dark-skinned 
and Muslim foreigners across the United States were suspected as 
threats to national security. Immigrants and refugees who arrived dur-
ing this period entered a different America than had existed in the 
years following the Hart-Cellar and Refugee Acts.
According to an interviewee at the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS),26 the policy changes from 1996 have, above all other recent 
events, had the largest “downstream” effects on refugee and refugee 
families’ access to public assistance. Welfare27 first came under attack 
by social and fiscal conservatives who criticized the system as inef-
ficient and costly. They viewed “welfare checks” as disincentives to 
work that fostered a culture of unemployment and poverty. Public 
debates played off of perceptions of “welfare queen” single mothers 
who chose to live idly on the largesse of the government, rather than 
looking for work. This popular—however exaggerated—image, as 
well as the increased financial strain of funding the welfare program, 
generated bipartisan support for the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act (PRWORA), and Democratic President Bill Clinton 
signed the Act into law.
Welfare reform transformed the nature of public assistance by impos-
ing new restrictions on programs and eligibility, including a five-year 
time limit, and reducing caseloads up to 75 percent.28 Yet PRWORA 
also included lesser-known provisions with landmark impacts on non-
citizen communities in the United States. The Act was the first piece of 
national legislation to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens 
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in their eligibility for public benefits. Prior to 1996, any U.S. resident 
could qualify for welfare, regardless of legal status. After PRWORA, 
eligibility for most federally funded benefits was tied to an additional 
factor: legal status. Citizens could receive assistance for up to five 
cumulative years throughout their lifetime, while refugees could only 
receive assistance for their first five years in the United States;29 legal 
permanent residents were barred from assistance for their first five 
years (and then could only receive benefits from the state); and undoc-
umented immigrants were barred indefinitely from all national and 
most state-funded assistance.30
These non-citizen provisions were added in response to claims that 
immigrants were weighing down welfare caseloads and perhaps com-
ing to the United States expressly for the prospect of “free” benefits. 
Immigrants were using significant amounts of public assistance, evi-
denced by Congressional Research Service reports showing non-citi-
zen welfare participation rates nearly doubled between 1989 (7%) and 
1996 (12%).31 The Act had the anticipated effect of pushing non-citi-
zens’ welfare rates back down to 8% by 2001, and again was hailed an 
economic success.32
To explain such a dramatic fall in welfare use among citizens and 
non-citizens alike, many assume that low-income Americans have 
since found employment and raised their standard of living or that 
non-citizens have been naturalized. But Michael Fix, Vice President 
of the Migration Policy Institute, challenges this conclusion with the 
concern that families may have left welfare, but without necessarily 
achieving full self-sufficiency. He commented at a Brookings Institu-
tion Welfare and Beyond Forum in 2002:
We see steep declines in benefit use for refugees, declines that we can’t 
fully explain. We see especially steep declines among poor families living 
in states with fast-growing immigrant populations and poorest safety 
nets. And we see that naturalization and income gains do not explain 
most of these declines.33
At least in part, state-funded assistance programs fill some of this 
welfare gap. Thirty-five states created additional allocations to fund 
assistance programs for non-citizens beyond what PRWORA pre-
scribed.34 Neither federal nor state programs, however, are open to 
undocumented immigrants and, as one Hennepin County employee 
remarked, “many of them are on the streets.” Non-citizen populations 
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are swiftly growing in states like Texas and Ohio because of their large 
job markets, yet such states offer virtually no safety-net assistance to 
women, children, the elderly or disabled, or other non-citizens who 
may need health insurance or temporary unemployment assistance.35 
As one’s access to assistance is contingent on state-provided programs, 
location, like legal status, has become another primary factor in immi-
grant and refugee welfare.
State and local institutions traditionally bore the brunt of immigra-
tion costs by providing English classes, expanding public transporta-
tion systems, building affordable housing, and increasing funding to 
schools and health clinics for special resources such as translators and 
cultural training. The passage of PRWORA in 1996 only shifted costs 
more heavily onto the states and counties already burdened with large 
and growing immigrant populations.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1997 caused a further downward shift in costs, placing additional 
financial responsibility on immigrants who wished to bring family 
members to join them in the United States. The 1997 law legally acti-
vated the broad principles of the public charge doctrine and required 
all non-refugee immigrants to enter or remain in the U.S. based on 
sponsorship. Citizen or permanent-resident family members and 
employers could sponsor new immigrants by agreeing to take full 
financial responsibility and concede their own eligibility for public 
benefits for the first five years. Because reuniting family in the new 
country is of such importance for immigrants, one Hennepin County 
manager critically questions the logic and effectiveness of the sponsor-
ship principle:
I certainly understand where the federal government was coming from 
when they implemented [this law], but I also understand that if I had 
family member who was in a refugee camp and hungry and in less than 
hygienic conditions…I would sign anything they asked me to sign or that 
I thought I could sign in order to get that family member over to where 
I was and to have a better life. So, whether that means I thought I could 
actually take care of them or not, I sure as hell would say I could.36
The sponsorship policy is certainly effective in keeping immigrants 
off of welfare caseloads, but despite its purpose of guiding immigrants 
to help support one another, the requirements may instead increase 
downward pressure on their overall welfare.
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Additional cause for concern about immigrant welfare is the result 
of the negative casting of welfare recipients in the public debates as 
“lazy” or manipulating the system for free money.37 Many immigrants 
avoid public services, either because they would be prohibited from 
sponsoring family visas, or they could be deported as “public charges” 
or be exposed as undocumented. For instance, WIC, a free nutrition 
education program for pregnant mothers and children, is one of the 
few state-funded programs in Minnesota that is offered to anyone, 
regardless of legal status. A Hennepin county WIC staff member specu-
lates that WIC’s Latino clientele dropped over the past decade because 
of these “chilling” effects reaching across all Latina mothers in all pub-
lic programs, both documented and undocumented.38
Fix also comments on the “spillover effect” of welfare fear in mixed 
citizen/non-citizen families:
Now of course one of the lessons, at least for me, of welfare reform is 
that it’s very difficult to target cuts at one population without having 
spillover effects on other populations…According to the census, 85% 
of children in families with a legal immigrant parent are themselves 
citizens, and in the wake of welfare reform what we see is that citizen 
children in these mixed status families are less likely to receive TANF 
and food stamps and are more likely to be uninsured than poor kids in 
citizen families. We see the same kind of spillover effect among refugee 
populations.39
Thus, the overall health and wealth of non-citizen populations has 
been at increased risk since welfare reform, despite nominal increases 
in their employment rates and decreased dependence on public pro-
grams. Economist George Borjas claims that food insecurity has risen 
among immigrant families, who may lack the income to buy nutritious 
food and yet are ineligible for healthy food programs such as Food 
Stamps.40 Welfare reform has mixed results in citizen and non-citizen 
communities alike. The reforms reduced welfare caseloads and raised 
employment statistics. However, the reform and stigmatization of wel-
fare recipients affects non-citizens so strongly that many eligible and 
needy families risk their well being and health in order to avoid legal 
repercussions and to sponsor family members as new immigrants. 
Moreover, costs that were eliminated at the national level were simply 
shifted elsewhere—to state budgets and to the sponsoring families of 
new immigrants.
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Welfare reform was enacted in the spirit of Douglas Massey’s “social 
contract”: only those that attempt to work are allowed temporary assis-
tance. However, the reformed public assistance system affected non-
citizens in unexpectedly harsh ways. Instead of supporting a target 
needy population to achieve self-sufficiency, welfare reform exacer-
bated the potential to compound poverty and overwhelm local gov-
ernments.41
E. Terrorism Breeds Social and Economics Fears
When terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the 
Pentagon occurred on September 11, 2001, all U.S. residents felt the 
shock—citizens, immigrants, and refugees alike. During the period 
of grief, Americans were both touched and traumatized, making the 
lasting effects of 9/11 not only economic and political, but personal. 
The personal characteristics of the hijackers became immediately rel-
evant information. The nation’s interest in post-9/11 immigration thus 
shifted from how many immigrants enter the United States to a stron-
ger interest in who enters and their national origin, religion, ethnicity, 
and past history relative to potential terrorist organizations.42 New 
background check requirements were added to an already backlogged 
visa application process, and rumors circulated that applications from 
certain national groups (including Middle Easterners, East Africans, 
and those from the Caribbean) were indefinitely wait listed. A particu-
larly controversial federal program called NSEERS43 required all adult 
males from Arab and Muslim countries to register and be interviewed 
annually in order to track their activities. Deportation proceedings 
also spiked following September 11, as hundreds of Arab males were 
removed for minor crimes and due-process rights were temporarily 
eliminated.44
In Minneapolis and St. Paul, Somali individuals and communities 
were on the alert for their personal safety. One man who was quoted 
on Minnesota Public Radio remarked that he was fearful about his 
wife walking to the store alone at night and that his children might 
hear anti-Muslim slurs as they walked to school. Yet above all, he was 
shocked and pained to hear his six-year-old son ask, after hearing 
of the search for Osama bin Laden, “is the government going to kill 
us, and all Muslims?”45 Other Minnesota Muslims remember being 
labeled “terrorists,” spat on, and told to “go back home” in the weeks 
and months following 9/11.46
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Police harassment and high-profile tragedies incited community-
wide anger and anxiety. Shortly after the attacks, a 66-year-old Somali 
elder was assaulted without cause while waiting at a bus stop and later 
died in the hospital. Police initially disregarded witnesses’ testimony 
of a tall, white male attacker and the medical examiner identified natu-
ral causes for death. Later, the attack was verified as a homicide. In 
another incident, a 28-year-old Somali man with a history of mental 
illness was shot repeatedly by six Minneapolis police when he charged 
at them with a machete and crowbar. The police claimed that they had 
followed appropriate procedure before shooting in self-defense, but 
the Somali and neighboring communities nonetheless were outraged 
and accused the officers of excessive force.
In November of 2001, several money-wiring services in Minneapo-
lis were suspended and investigated for allegedly financing Islamic 
terrorists. Many Somalis were shocked—first, at the prospect of their 
charitable contributions being used for terrorist groups, and second, 
at the devastating impact that would follow from being unable to send 
money to support remaining family members in Somalia or in refugee 
camps. One man recalled of his local money wiring company:
When Al Barakaat was closed, everybody felt that other will be closed. 
Families back home were calling, [saying] ‘Will I be getting this month’s 
money, what’s going to happen?’ People here didn’t know. Some people 
here even went so far as, ‘Should I even go to these places to send 
money? What if I’m accused of sending money?’ Some people came to 
me, and said ‘Can I go to this one that’s open? Can they trace me back?’ 
We tell them sending money is not a crime.46
Later the same year, the FBI conducted numerous “information 
gathering” interviews with young Somali men, again raising security 
concerns in this community. The executive director of a prominent 
community organization recalls how Somalis’ fears of the FBI were 
heightened by their history of political persecution in Somalia:
In Somalia there was a dictatorship for 20 years, and if the police knocked 
on your door, you were in real trouble. It’s not like, ‘come here and talk 
to us voluntarily…So I’m really sure that people will be worried if they 
were called by the police or the FBI for an interview…What we do not 
agree with is simply to have a net-casting of people, simply because 
of their religion, simply because of their ethnic background, or simply 
because of their country of origin. That is not the American way.47
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Although most events were minor personal injuries and isolated 
incidents, rumors spread swiftly throughout the close communi-
ties and exaggerated existing fears of political persecution across all 
Somalis.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous and enduring effect of 9/11 on non-
citizens, more than isolated targeting, was felt in the turn toward fiscal 
conservatism. Businesses and employees suffered the lingering effects 
of increasing national security and defense expenditures as the fund-
ing for domestic social services dwindled.48 Tourist, hotel, dining, and 
travel industries took serious hits in the months following the attacks, 
forcing companies to lay off hundreds of thousands of workers in 
2002 alone.49 Minnesota had been gradually reducing benefits for non-
citizens since 2000, but severe budget cuts between 2002 and 2003 led 
to the reduction or elimination of several key assistance programs 
for all low-income populations, but particularly for non-citizen, low-
income communities. Food stamp programs for legal permanent resi-
dents were reduced, so that only permanent residents above the age 
of 50 could qualify for food assistance, a “basic need.”50 Emergency 
medical services were also cut for non-immigrant visitors, and refugee 
cash assistance steadily dwindled, from 36 months to only 8 months of 
coverage.
In the non-profit sector, funding from all sources has become more 
rare and difficult to secure. Mutual assistance associations increas-
ingly struggle to find funding, specifically for basic operating costs 
and broad populations. An employee at the Brian Coyle Community 
Center, which serves the densest population of Somalis in the Twin 
Cities, remarks that he has lost some flexibility and autonomy in his 
services:
Foundations, for the past 10 years, used to give grants to support services 
for anyone without a job, but now they only focus on narrow issues, like 
seniors or for crime prevention. So you have to adjust your mission, and 
sometimes it’s hard. Foundations come out and check up on the org. You 
have to be very transparent. I only can serve about 6 out of 10 [clients], 
because of narrow funding, limited money in certain areas, and can only 
use volunteers.51
Another Brian Coyle Center administrator agrees, speaking of the 
growing gaps in youth and health program funding:
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The grants are also focused too narrowly. Foundations focus on fund-
ing outcomes, not operating costs. You know, there’s no loose money 
anymore, for technology—and technology gets really expensive for 
nonprofits—for phones, heat, electricity. All the foundations want to 
fund a staff member and a particular program, but we have other costs 
too…There’s less youth money, less for basic health needs, there’s more 
targeted toward mental health…And recently there’s been a downward 
cycle of funding from state and federal sources.52
Even the state of Minnesota, despite its traditions of social liberal-
ism and tolerance of newcomers, is impacted by changes in federal 
policy and economic resources. The “power of the purse” is illumi-
nated in this case. States are allowed to create policies and elect lead-
ers that resonate with the opinions and values of the state residents; 
however, shrinking federal resources translate into shrinking state and 
local resources. This compounds the pressure for “self-sufficiency” 
at the local level since virtually no support exists at the national level 
and support is falling even at the state level. Thus, the requirements of 
survival—housing, jobs, learning English, health care, cultural adjust-
ment, maintaining families, etc.—must happen by the grace of local 
resources and the will of immigrant families themselves.
III. Triple Trauma: Individual Obstacles and Community Support
A. The Un-Televised America
One Somali elder describes his first experience with winter as com-
plete bewilderment. A friend had prepared him for icy sidewalks, but 
he hadn’t known to wear a hat, and during his first venture outside 
he feared his ears were “breaking off.”53 Many Somalis cited surprise, 
awe, confusion, and culture shock in regards to Minnesota weather, 
landscape, and society as their initial impressions of the United States.54 
Yet, as one community cleric explained, “many Somalis assume that 
once you go to America, it’s just blissfulness and enjoyment and fun 
and easy life. And that’s not the case.”55 A Hennepin County employee 
echoes this sense of disconnect between the American ideal and the 
refugee experience:
From abroad, a lot of people think the United States is rich—we say 
we’re the most powerful nation—and so when [resettlement agencies] 
say ‘You’re going to the United States,’ [Somalis] believe that the United 
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States is going to take care of them. I don’t know that that’s necessarily 
true, but I don’t think we do a good enough job up front of explaining 
that that’s not the case. When they got here, I think they expected things 
to be very different.56
Although the standard of living in the United States is an improve-
ment on that of still embattled Somalia, or on refugee camps, many 
Somalis do struggle with financial and psychosocial challenges in their 
new home. They enter American life not only as foreigners, but many 
enter as low-income families, non-English speakers, and victims of 
psychological trauma in the throes of yet another life transition. From 
their homeland to refugee camps to the resettlement country, it may 
be their third transition. For many, moving to the United States was, in 
fact, a third and unexpected source of emotional trauma.
Abundant jobs, education, and housing were found to be three pri-
mary factors that first attracted Somalis to Minnesota’s Twin Cities.57 A 
Somali lawyer at Legal Aid claims:
These are doctors, lawyers, judges, poets, and all this but they’re driving 
taxis instead because they can’t make it here. For example, you remem-
ber the man who was just here… he is a poet. That disk was full of 
poems, thousands, and it would be a great asset to American society, if 
they were translated to English. But it would take a long time for him to 
translate them, and he can’t afford to do that. He has to take care of his 
family here and also his family back home in Somalia.58
However, Somalis’ access to each of these life essentials has been 
impaired by the changing legislative, social, and economic climate 
since 1996. These changes threaten the social mobility opportunities 
for Somali refugees (particularly future generations) as well as nega-
tively affect their self-esteem and identity formation as Somali-Ameri-
cans. This section documents their challenges and the unique internal 
support networks that Somalis employ to overcome obstacles and the 
threat of “triple trauma” in their own ethnic communities.
1. Obstacles in Income
A resettlement agency director claims that, “everyone assumes that 
we must be on welfare,” but he asserts “Somalis come here for work, 
not for welfare.”59 In fact, Somalis are considered among the least 
welfare-dependent groups in Minnesota. A “self-support” index mea-
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sures that Somalis’ ratings rose from 30% in 1999 to over 80% in certain 
Minnesota counties.60 The community is still relatively new, and most 
families are fully covered by health insurance and public assistance if 
they are eligible. However, welfare’s time limits now persuade many 
to opt out of or shorten their English or professional re-certification 
classes in order to work to support large families and send remittances 
overseas. Since 9/11, noticeable religious discrimination has impacted 
Somalis’ chances at employment. A focus group participant from a 2001 
study explained that, “a woman with xijaab will get a job last, when 
it’s impossible to get help, because companies don’t like to hire us.” 
One Somali lawyer agreed that cases like these had increased dramati-
cally following the attacks on the World Trade Center and publicity 
about Osama bin Laden and Muslim covering traditions in the Middle 
East. In their first few years as refugees, most Somalis will be eligible 
for assistance in finding employment and will receive government-
sponsored health care. However, concerns may arise after their first 
five years in the country, when Somalis lose access to assistance and 
may struggle to find secure employment, and the elderly and disabled 
may lose supplemental income (SSI). Naturalizing as U.S. citizens and 
learning English is increasingly critical for this population in order to 
maintain their income, particularly for non-working individuals such 
as the elderly and disabled.
2. Obstacles in Education
Quality public schools and institutions of higher education, including 
the University of Minnesota, make the Twin Cities a premier center 
for both private and public education. One interviewee from the Min-
nesota Historical Society described education as having “always been 
important to Somalis.” She had been told that, “when the war hap-
pened and there was no more infrastructure to provide that education, 
America became one, of a few places, became an accessible place to go 
and get a quality education for their kids.”61 However, students are 
undereducated when they enter the States, don’t speak English, have 
little parent support in education, and then are thrown in with peers 
with little hope of “catching up.” University of Minnesota professor 
and immigration scholar Katherine Fennelly writes:
Many immigrant children are from families working multiple jobs, so 
parents aren’t around, and some families are quite impoverished. Young 
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children are not really ready for school, because the parents/grandpar-
ents do not speak English and do not have access to bilingual preschool 
programs.62
While the need for bilingual and English language teachers soars, 
federal and state cuts in education funding only contribute to the over-
all decline in public school education in Minneapolis and St. Paul. One 
state legislator gave K–12 schools “a failing grade for the state, and a 
C in the Metro area,” explaining that “the results don’t lie—immigrant 
youth have high drop-out rates.”63 President Bush’s No Child Left 
Behind initiative stripped funding from “under-performing” schools. 
Consequently, schools in more immigrant-heavy areas have less fund-
ing. According to one foundation officer:
We have seen major disinvestments in after school programs, which are 
very important in young people’s identity and social support, consider-
ing that their parents are pretty much employed. You have to have con-
sistency, you have to challenge young people, and we are not doing that 
with after school programs. You have success stories, but if you look at 
the graduation rate, we are losing ground with immigrants and refugees, 
just as we have with African Americans and Native Americans.64
Education as a “great equalizer” is threatened by both funding 
shortages and sudden influxes of non-English-speaking children that 
require resources to be pulled from other areas for specialized atten-
tion and curricula. Definite strides have been made in improving the 
schools on tight budgets, especially in the St. Paul districts. As spend-
ing cuts continue, however, the future is uncertain.
Developing self-esteem and a firm sense of identity is another cru-
cial element of elementary and secondary education. Unfortunately, it 
marks another major battle for young Somalis transitioning to the Twin 
Cities today. Somali traditions in conservative dress, behavior, and val-
ues already differ widely from the ideals of individualism and liberal 
attitudes toward sex and drugs that define contemporary American 
youth culture. However, their foreign dress, unfamiliar accents, and 
behavior make Somali youth vulnerable to teasing by other students. 
Perhaps the worst impact of September 11 is seen now in schools, 
where U.S.-born students mock the xijaab or call out Muslim class-
mates as terrorists, mimicking media caricatures of Islam. This has 
damaging and long-term effects on second-generation Somalis and 
their self-confidence.
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3. Obstacles in Housing
In order to establish a true sense of belonging in a new place, one must 
first have a tangible, physical “home.” Because of refugees’ likelihood 
to receive low wages while supporting large families, they tend to con-
gregate in high density, low-cost housing projects. Somali and other 
East African populations are most concentrated in complexes such 
as Riverside Plaza Apartments in South Minneapolis or in St. Paul’s 
Skyline Towers on University Avenue. Both of these areas are locally 
dubbed “Little Somalia” or “Vertical Africa.” Unfortunately, many of 
these same complexes are nicknamed “ghetto in the sky” or “crack 
towers” because of the poverty, depression, poor upkeep, idle youth, 
and crime that linger there. There are few affordable alternatives. 
Somalis may be rejected from apartments because they lack rental his-
tory or because of language or cultural misunderstandings. Just as in 
public education, federal budget cuts have had detrimental effects on 
the availability of affordable and “section eight” subsidized housing 
in Minneapolis and St. Paul. Gentrification projects across the Twin 
Cities are also raising property values out of the reach of many low-
income, largely minority communities, including Somali and other 
refugee populations.
All refugees receive immediate temporary housing in their first 90 
days in the country; however, this generous accommodation comes 
with a price. In an increasingly tight housing market, refugee groups 
were once given their immediate housing in a complex with such a high 
demand that two years’ worth of low-income and minority residents 
were on its waiting list.65 When Somali refugees were given first pref-
erence in the new units, it is said that serious “trust issues” developed 
between African Americans and the Somalis, according to an employee 
of the Brian Coyle Community Center. In a post-9/11 period of eco-
nomic instability, especially for historically disadvantaged groups such 
as African Americans, Somalis were seen as privileged competitors for 
limited jobs, resources, and services throughout the cities. Despite the 
preferential treatment they receive through resettlement programs, all 
Somalis’ rental assistance ends after 90 days, at which point they find 
themselves facing the same barriers to affordable housing as other 
immigrant and minority populations.
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IV. A Community Responds
A. Somali Support Networks
A degree of self-sufficiency has always been required for immigrants 
to adapt to their new country and overcome the inevitable obstacles 
of language and culture, in order to re-create a meaningful life in a 
new place. Somalis are not alone in facing such obstacles, although 
they face a steeper climb to well being and integration than did some 
past generations of immigrants. Thus, according to a social contract 
of “rights” and “duties,” U.S. policymakers require that Somalis be 
innovative in ensuring their own survival. Somalis have done so by 
creating community organizations and becoming outspoken advocates 
for their needs.
The Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota (CSCM) was 
the first Somali-led organization in Minnesota. Established in 1994, 
CSCM was founded by several Somali men in order to provide counsel 
and English training to incoming Somalis and unite the local diasporic 
community across clan differences. CSCM today is located in the Brian 
Coyle Center Building in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood of South 
Minneapolis, within the densest neighborhood concentration of Soma-
lis in the country. The organization is grant funded, employs 15 staff 
members (14 of which are East African) and is overseen by a 14-mem-
ber Board of Directors (10 of which are East African). Its mission is “to 
strengthen the capacity of Somalis in Minnesota to become contribut-
ing members of society, while keeping their culture,” and offers youth 
mentoring, job seeking, advocacy, women’s support, and community 
education. The Brian Coyle Center plays a “parenting” role to CSCM 
by helping to establish policies and build capacity, and renting its 
space for East African organizations like CSCM to easily reach East 
Africans, lessening the burdens of transportation and interpretation.66 
Brian Coyle Center is one of nine community centers funded and 
coordinated by Pillsbury United Communities, a non-profit agency 
descended from the late 19th century tradition of settlement houses to 
improve the quality of life in urban slums.67
Interviewees at Brian Coyle and CSCM both admitted that Somalis’ 
long-term integration into Minnesota society is not likely to happen 
directly through their programs; they have limited contact with outsid-
ers due to the isolated nature of the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, 
bordered by highways. However, they stressed the importance of pro-
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viding for new arrivals’ immediate needs in an informal, communal 
environment, and allowing an internal community to build among this 
“gateway” neighborhood of new Minneapolis residents. As one inter-
viewee noted:
I see a resettlement agency being something like Lutheran Social Ser-
vices, with offices and departments, like a government office. We offer 
the same services, but it’s just a different approach. We’re more holistic, 
casual…I wouldn’t say it’s a better way, but just a different model.68
An interviewee at CSCM also mentioned the sense of ownership 
that local Somalis feel about the Center and CSCM as an organization 
made of their community members and serving community interests. 
“Somalis come and they feel like the organization is theirs,” he said, 
continuing, “they feel welcomed.”69 Staff members give an extraor-
dinary amount of attention to their clients, driving them to doctors’ 
appointments and meetings, donating money when someone can-
not pay his or her monthly rent, writing letters to employers on their 
behalf, and coaching them for citizenship interviews.
CSCM is better than mainstream agencies (for example, the International 
Institute of Minnesota) because they have fewer people to serve and can 
focus on one community, they know the culture. New refugees can com-
municate with the CSCM leaders, even after hours and they have greater 
ownership over ‘this is our community’ and then when they become 
self-sufficient they get involved in the community to give back. They 
consider Brian Coyle ‘their own home.’70
Voluntary contributions also come from the community. CSCM 
manages up to 80 volunteers each year to operate its programs, and 
over 30 Somali elders also work in the community to resolve disputes, 
deal with domestic abuse issues, help with cultural celebrations, and 
mentor young people. Community centers like Brian Coyle and CSCM 
help preserve a sense of home and guide families through cultural tran-
sitions by rebuilding family and community unity and strength. The 
common concern of CSCM and Pillsbury United is funding. CSCM, 
for example, faces an overwhelming need for programs such as Eng-
lish language classes, daycare, and the skill-building program for East 
African women, yet funding shortages keep the waiting list nearly as 
long as the list of participants.71
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Compared to other community-based social service organizations, 
the African Development Center (ADC) has a much more specialized 
focus. It serves as a bridge to help established African immigrants 
improve their income and community development opportunities. 
The executive director worked as a Wells Fargo banker for 12 years 
and then transferred his financial and leadership skills to the African 
immigrant community. In 2004, he established the ADC as a catalyst 
for training, integrating, and generating wealth for entrepreneurial 
Africans. ADC services consist of extended training and workshops 
to orient Africans with American concepts, such as credit scores, loans 
(with standard interest or interest-free Islamic financing), mortgages, 
and other elements of business and home ownership. As a community 
development corporation, ADC occupies an important role in building 
the leadership and self-sufficiency capacity of African immigrants in 
the Twin Cities. Their work is “beyond resettlement” in many ways, by 
investing in Somalis’ economic and social capital for long-term growth. 
Both CSCM and ADC benefit the Somali population by creating jobs, 
providing resettlement services directly in the community in a familiar 
cultural setting, and strengthening the community’s ability to operate 
organizations and build wealth. Despite their individual challenges, 
Somalis as a community have learned to adapt and thrive by their own 
will and creativity.
Unfortunately, some Somalis’ will to survive also creates a backlash. 
Some employees in public assistance offices and public schools have 
picked up on an “aggressive, dig every hole” assertive behavior in 
some Somalis, and these individuals have tainted the reputation of all 
Somalis.72 One Hennepin County employee explains:
I think the [Somali] community is one that wants to work, wants to have 
their own money, wants to contribute. But they learn very quickly that 
there are rules and rights that protect them and entitle them to certain 
things that they, to some degree, not all, have become very demanding 
and vocal, for example the prayer or mediation rooms. It isn’t a ‘this 
would be wonderful if you could accommodate this’ it’s a ‘I need this, 
I want this’…And I think part of that comes from their coming from 
a society pretty much of bartering, and the government officials were 
corrupt, and so they think the more pressure they put on you, the more 
likely they are to get what they want.73
She justified her comments, saying that, “many of them are, besides 
being my staff, my friends, and they’re just wonderful people in the 
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community.” Setting the majority aside, however, she notices that a 
small section of overly assertive Somalis “are getting a stigma, and that 
hurts [all of] them.”
Local media also freely broadcasts Somalis’ requests for religious 
accommodation: Somali taxi drivers refusing to transport alcohol or 
refusing to handle pork products as grocery cashiers, or their requests 
for Somali signs and prayer rooms at the Minneapolis–St. Paul Inter-
national Airport. Public schools have been overwhelmed by numerous 
requests from Somali parents, while some families leave the schools 
altogether for Qur’anic schools that uphold traditional Somali culture. 
This strong advocacy from Somalis is understandable, however it may 
negatively impact the future. In their efforts to preserve cultural tradi-
tions and community, Somalis may overly isolate themselves and limit 
their children’s opportunities to grow up bi-culturally and eventually 
merge into U.S. society.
Moreover, as the economy wanes and jobs are scarce, economic 
mobility and the classic integration pattern of immigrants eventually 
dispersing beyond ethnic enclaves is changing. One employee at the 
Brian Coyle Center claims that “[Somalis] are beginning to feel the wall 
and feel that they can’t advance and move up…there are more Somali 
single parents, we’re starting to see Somali gangs…it’s like they’re 
learning what institutional racism is.”74 Another employee elaborates:
I think we’re at a crossroads…usually [the Cedar-Riverside] neighbor-
hood turns over with new immigrant groups—before in the 1980s there 
were Vietnamese and Koreans here, and then it turned over to East 
Africans in the ’90s. But it hasn’t turned over yet [as I expected it would 
by this time]. It seems like the Somalis are afraid to leave because they’re 
comfortable here, they have their mosques and their grocery stores. I 
have some friends who live out in Burnsville and their kids get taunted 
in school. It seems like no one wants to move out from this isolated 
area.75
Some Somalis have left the city for rural factory jobs, yet those that 
remain in the Twin Cities are beginning to find themselves “stuck 
in the underclass,” and cling to tight-knit, culturally comfortable 
enclaves. It is those same enclaves that have helped them survive in 
a difficult immigration climate, but for how long is it healthy to avoid 
mainstream society? Eventually such self-segregation will have conse-
quences for their relations with native-born Minnesotans.
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B. Concerns for Integration
Somali refugees had already exhibited a coping strategy of relocation 
by moving from other areas of the United States to Minnesota for its 
abundant economic resources, public spending, and tolerance for diver-
sity. When these conditions began to change between 1996 and 2006, 
research indicates that Somali refugees reacted in two ways: (1) Creat-
ing and relying more heavily on African- or Somali-led organizations 
in order to foster community cohesion and provide employment, edu-
cation, and housing opportunities within Somali communities (rather 
than in mainstream companies and institutions), and (2) Requesting 
special accommodations or exemptions in order to maintain Islamic 
and Somali cultural traditions. This suggests that, in response to a 
decreasing job market and public resources and increasing social hos-
tility, Somali refugees seem to retreat into their own communities and 
religious and cultural traditions for support. Despite their challenges, 
Somalis do not seem to be falling to the “bottom of the melting pot” to 
be burned. Instead their communities are thriving: people are gaining 
advanced degrees, starting small businesses, and beginning to finance 
their own homes. They embody U.S. immigration policies’ emphasis 
on self-sufficiency as well as the sociological concept of “collective 
efficacy,” that cohesive communities provide support and agency for 
group problem solving.76 The executive director of New Americans 
Community Services highlights Somalis’ motivations:
Somalis, when given the opportunity, to some degree, like self-suffi-
ciency. That’s first. Then secondly, we have bigger families and like send-
ing money back home. We want to work hard, pay our bills here, and 
have enough to send back to family in Somalia or wherever. We have 
inter-family dependency…We just brought [the culture of] Africa here, 
brought Somalia here, with the way we depend on each other.77
This community strength results from a combination of African fam-
ily tradition, strong diasporic bonds, and the unique need for Somalis 
to unite and overcome the divisions that still plague Somalia. The 
research also supports the conclusion that, because the political and 
social changes that occurred between 1996 and 2006 limited tolerance 
for both social and economic flexibility, Somalis are forced to adapt 
culturally in addition to losing funding for their internal organiza-
tional supports. Not only does America send the message that Somali 
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culture and religion is potentially threatening (in its association with 
Islamic fundamentalists), but that the institutions, charter schools, and 
cultural centers that celebrate Somali traditions also cannot be funded 
by the state or mainstream America. Besides facilitating Somalis’ ini-
tial relocation, the United States does much less in the way of a wel-
come—materially or symbolically—for the Somalis than was done for 
immigrants and refugees in years past.
Because of this growing imbalance, Somali communities may be at 
risk of becoming isolated and not fully reaching the last stage of reset-
tlement, integration. Somalis, other minority and immigrant communi-
ties, and mainstream Minnesotans now face the collective challenge of 
initiating collaborative projects, engaging with one another, respecting 
one another’s boundaries and limitations, and re-envisioning a new 
Minneapolis and St. Paul for all. The final section of this essay will 
address possible models for this collaborative process.
V. Re-Envisioning an Integrated Twin Cities
The terms “cultural brokering,” “bridging,” and “cultural liaison” 
resurfaced multiple times in my interviews, visits, and interactions 
with Somali refugees. The process of “brokering” refugee adjustment 
is done first by large, contractual resettlement agencies, such as Catho-
lic Charities, yet after 90 days, refugees must navigate this process vir-
tually on their own. Public and non-profit organizations step in to aid 
this “brokering” between Somalis’ needs and U.S. systems of services 
in order to ease any miscommunications and complications that may 
arise. Nevertheless, the relationships between Somalis and native-born 
Americans are facilitated by individuals. Thus, in addition to balanc-
ing financial responsibilities, cross-cultural learning for all individuals 
is a crucial element in resettlement and integration to moderate the 
extreme views and clumsy stereotypes that develop between misin-
formed communities.
A certain amount of self-sufficiency is expected from newcomers to 
prevent the state from becoming overburdened, yet the state should at 
least show rhetorical support for the most rooted elements of newcom-
ers’ identity, such as religion or culture, and should sponsor public 
events and discussions. Somalis should also make efforts to interact 
with non-Somalis whenever possible. If these objectives are achieved, 
neither group should be economically overextended nor pressured to 
change the fundamental elements of its identity as a source of commu-
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nity cohesion and strength. Cross-cultural learning, or public educa-
tion, then, is the final component to inform groups about one another, 
eradicate distorted stereotypes and fears, and create a common his-
tory upon which new conceptions of community can be constructed. 
Several remarkable examples of contributions, leadership, and public 
education in the Twin Cities have helped to ease the burdens of change 
as Somalis enter this new space.
This is not to suggest that re-envisioning and rebuilding a com-
munity are without challenges. The future long-term resettlement of 
Somali refugees is at risk as the result of compounding social and 
economic factors. Such factors include negative perceptions of welfare 
dependents, enduring subtle racism and assumptions about the “privi-
leges” given to immigrants and refugees, and fears over Muslims in the 
United States. Nevertheless, Somalis’ best coping strategies—creating 
organizations and strong self-advocacy—are sources of both support 
and tension, as they risk harming future relations with Minnesotans. 
A truly re-envisioned and integrated Twin Cities will require cultural 
brokering; its members will need to dialogue, take stock of their contri-
butions and burdens, and collectively choose the journey forward.78
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APPENDIX
Policy Recommendations
For National Policy
•  Establish state committees to monitor the welfare and needs of all 
new refugee communities as they transition from benefits-eligible 
refugee status to benefits-ineligible permanent resident status after 
five years, particularly SSI-recipients and communities with limited 
social support.
•  Encourage national and state leadership that is supportive and 
speaks in practical and specific terms about immigrants.
For State Programs
•  Share successful curricula and teaching methods between Minne-
apolis and St. Paul public schools curricula. Begin piloting St. Paul 
School’s nationally known English learning programs in Minneapo-
lis Public Schools.
•  Create a parallel Office of Multi-Cultural Services in Ramsey County 
government.
•  Hold public forums and encourage community research into rela-
tions between Somalis and police, ICE officers, and the FBI.
For Mainstream and Mutual Assistance Associations
•  Conduct community needs assessments and evaluations of service 
delivery once every two years (may be done formally with a con-
tracted consultant or informally, using elders).
•  Foundations should set aside a minimum level of funding for basic 
operational costs for community-based organizations.
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•  Collaborate with Minneapolis Public Libraries to develop a Somali-
American center for cross-cultural learning. Publicize this center in all 
libraries across the Twin Cities and outer suburbs.
•  Increase work on leadership development in immigrant communi-
ties and capacity building for smaller organizations. Develop part-
nerships like Confederation of Somali Community and the Brian 
Coyle Community Center.
For Somalis
•  Encourage young people to embrace biculturalism and seek com-
munity support for troubled teens.
•  Accept that there is a limit on the amount of financial support the 
U.S. government can provide and pursue additional training and 
degrees to become self-sufficient.
•  Approach neighbors of different backgrounds with respect and 
attempt to learn more about their historical background and values 
for life in the United States.
